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STANDING TO CHALLENGE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
INTRODUCTION

The question of who has standing to challenge administrative action
overlaps, to a certain extent, the availibility of various methods of
challenge. For the sake of brevity the methods of challenge are not herein
discussed and the assumption is made that certain methods of challenge,
in addition to review by the courts are available. 1
Based upon this
assumption the scope of this article is standing to challenge under the
avaliable methods.
STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW

Who has standing to challenge administrative action? Statutory authorization to appeal from a decision of an agency is the most common
method provided by the Wyoming Legislature for challenging administrative action. Indeed, except for certain isolated instances, this is the only
method expressly sanctioned by the Legislature. Since Wyoming has no
Administrative Procedure Act, the provisions for appeal are scattered
intermittently throughout the statutes with no correlation among procedure
for review except as might have fortuitously occurred by usage of similar
language in establishing the various agencies.
Common statutory language which is used to denote standing to
challenge is "any person aggrieved," 2 "any person interested," "any person
aggrieved and affected," 4 and "any person dissatisfied," 5 may appeal from
the decision of the agency. Who is any person aggrieved or interested?
Wyoming case law on this subject is conspicuous by its almost total absence.
Apparently the only case dealing directly with the interpretation of these
words is dictum in Kelley v. Rhoads6 decided by the Supreme Court of
Wyoming in 1897. This case involved an action by a taxpayer against
the county assessor to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally collected.
Tie court stated:
Now in regard to hearing and opportunity for review, it is further
provided . . . that any person aggrieved by any proceedings
1.

See R. Anderson, Reviewability and Forms of Proceedings for Review, 16 Wyo. L.J.
308 (1962) . For a comprehensive discussion of federal law on standing to challenge,

see Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise, ch. 22 (1958).
2.

3.

(1957),
Wyo. Stat. § 39-29 (1957), Board of Equalization; Wyo. Stat. § 30-225 (b)
Oil and Gas Commission; Wyo. Stat. §§ 41-193 and 41-216 (1957), Board of Control;

Wyo. Stat. § 36-27 (1957), Land Commission; Wyo. Stat. § 26-98 (1957), Insurance
Commission; Wyo. Stat. § 11-249(D) (1957), Soil Conservation Board; Wyo. Stat.
§ 15-626 (1957), Zoning Board; and Wyo. Stat. § 9-303 (1957), Retirement Board.
Wyo. Stat. § 10-39 (1957), Aeronuatics Commission; Wyo. Stat. § 30-57 (1957),
Inspector of Mines; Wyo. Stat. § 37-45 (1957), Public Service Commission.

4.

Wyo. Stat. § 35-15

5.
6.

Wyo. Stat. § 17-106 (1957), Decision of Secretary of State under Blue Sky Laws.
7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593 (1897).
The case came up again in an action by the tax-

(1957),

Board of Health.

payer to recover the taxes paid. The court held that the state tax did not interfere
with interstate commerce. Kelley v. Rhoads, 9 Wyo. 352, 63 Pac. 935 (1901).
The
United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the property was

exempt from state tax tinder the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1902).
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NOTES

• . . may apply to the Board of County Commissioners . . . to
have the assessment equalized or corrected in any just particular.
• . .We perceive no reason why that regulation was not open to
any person in the situation of plaintiff, or any one whose property
had been taxed by the assessor . . . after the annual assessment.
The inference may be drawn from this language that "any person
aggrieved" is at least a person whose pecuniary interest is directly affected
by the appropriate tax statute.
A pecuniary interest was held sufficient to give plaintiff standing to
challenge in Cary v. Planning Board of Revere.7 Plaintiff sought to review
a determination, by the Planning Board, that approval of defendant's construction plan under the subdivision control law was not required and to
enjoin defendant's business construction on property adjacent to that on
which plaintiff held an outstanding and unpaid mortgage. The court
stated that the mortgagee had a pecuniary interest which was affected
by the determination appealed from because the proposed construction
would cause the mortgaged property to depreciate and plaintiff was therefore a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute.
The question of who has standing to challenge necessarily depends
upon the nature of the interest that must be affected in order to have
standing which interest is cusomarily discussed in terms of "deprivation
of a legal right" and "adversely affected in fact."
On the basis of the two preceding cases the proper criterion would
appear to be whether or not the person challenging the action was adversely affected in fact. This criterion requires that the plaintiff suffer in
fact even though his legal rights are not violated.8 In contrast any person
who is deprived of a legal right 9 always has standing to challenge administrative action. 10
An example distinguishing these criteria is whether or not competitors
have standing to challenge administrative action that adversely affects their
competitive interests. New Jersey appears to champion the liberal view
by application of the adversely affected in fact standard. In Walker v.
Borough of Stanhoape" the court held that potential loss of business by
a retailer of house trailers, whose sales lot was located four miles from
the Borough of Stanhope, was a direct enough interest to give him standing
to challenge an ordinance licensing and regulating trailer camps, even
though he was neither a citizen nor a taxpayer of the borough. Plaintiff
had standing to challenge administrative action regulating the use of
trailer homes although there clearly was no deprivation of a legal right.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

335 Mass. 740, 139 N.E.2d 920 (1957).
However it will be seen that in certain instances plaintiff is not permitted to
challenge even though he does suffer in fact.
A legal right may generally be defined as a right protected by common law or
statute.
See 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 22.04.
23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957).
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Here again pecuniary injury was sufficient to allow plaintiff standing.
The "legal right" standards was applied by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Circle Lounge and Grille v. Board of Appeal of Boston. 12 In this case action was brought under a "person aggrieved" statute
by a restaurant operator in a business district seeking to enjoin an order
permitting a variance to a restaurant in an adjacent area. The court held
that plaintiff was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of the
statute because "commonly a person aggrieved is one whose rights have
been infringed." The court reasoned that although plaintiff's business
would suffer to some extent by the establishment of another restaurant
that: "injury from business competition has generally been considered
damnum abseque injuria."
The Massachusetts view was reiterated by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Kreatchmen v. Ramsburg.13 The court relied heavily upon
Circle Lounge' 4 (supra) in reaching the decision that competitive interest
was not sufficient to grant standing to challenge.
The Model State Act 15 provides that "Any person aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this Act."
Thus the Model State Act does not attempt to define "any person aggrieved" but leaves this decision criterion to the common law of the
particular state.
Clearly the preferable view would appear to be the more liberal test
of whether the person challenging the action is adversely affected in fact.
In determining whether the particular person is adversely affected in fact
the court should seek the underlying purpose of the statute and determine
whether or not the challenger is within the class of persons for whose
benefit the statute was enacted. If so he should be entitled to standing to
challenge the administrative action regardless of whether or not petitioner's
legal right is involved.
STANDING

TO

CHALLENGE

ADMINISTRATIVE

RULES

16

The Model State Act authorizes the declaratory judgment to be used
to challenge the validity or applicability of administrative rules, but only
if petitioner is deprived of a legal right or privilege. The rule making
function of an agency generally speaking is analogous to the legislative
enactment of a statute and the adjudicative function of an agency is
similar to a court's decision of a case.' 7 There are, however, other areas
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

366
324 Mass. 430, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
See also Ahern v. Baker, ____Colo - ---P.2d 366 (1961), denying writ of mandamus because the one briging the action

must show a clear legal right to demand the performance of a certain act as well as
a clear legal duty on the part of the officer to do the thing demanded.
224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961).
See note 12, supra.
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (Fourth Draft), § 15.
Id. note 15, § 7.
This definition is imperfect because the converse may be true and therefore is
intended to provide only a very broad classification.

NOTES

of administrative action that are neither rule making nor adjudication
that raise problems as to standing to challenge. Broadly speaking, a rule
prescribes or interprets law and policy for certain classes of persons in
contrast to adjudication which determines the rights, duties and privileges
of specified parties.
Rules are generally classified as "interpretative"
Professor Davis defines a legislative rule as:

or "legislative."'"

the product of an exercise of legislative power by an administrative agency, pursuant to a grant of legislative power by the legislative body.
Professor Davis states, however, that a legislative rule may also be promulgated upon an implied or unclear grant of power, and that such rule is as
binding upon the courts as a statute if it is (1)within the granted power,
(2) issued pursuant to proper authority, and (3) reasonable. An interpretative rule issued by an administrative agency while not binding upon the
courts by reason of its authority does constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which the courts may refer for guidance. The
degree of weight given to an interpretative rule may depend upon whether
the court or the administrator is the expert in the particular subject,
whether the statute has been renacted to support the commonly applied
fiction that reenactment is an implied legislative approval of administrative
interpretations which may give the rule the force of law,19 and whether
the statute has been constructed contemporaneously with its enactment
which may also give it force of law.
Statutory provision for challenge of rules in Wyoming is almost nonexistent.20 The Model State Act provides that any interested person may
petition the agency requesting the promulgation, amendment or repeal of
agency rules. 2 1 The validity of any rule may be determined by declaratory
judgment in the district court when it appears that the rule, or its threatened
application, interferes with or impairs the legal rights or privileges of the
petitioner. 22 Any interested person may petition an agency for a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability to any person, property, or
state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable by it and such ruling may
be reviewed by the district court.2 3

Thus, under the Model State Act the

promulgation, amendment, repeal, application and validity of any rule
may be challenged providing the challenger has sufficient interest in the
subject matter.
The Wyoming Oil and Gas Commission Act 2 4 contains language
See 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 22.04.
This criterion is principally applied to Treasury Regulations in the area of Federal
Income Tax.
20. An exception to this statement is the Oil and Gas Commission Act considered infra.
21. See note 15, § 6.
22. See note 15, supra.
23. See note 15, § 7.
24. Wyo. Stat. § 30-216 through § 30-238, Title 23, ch. 6 (1957), creating and regulating
the Oil and Gas Commission.
18.
19.
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similar to the Model State Act. This Act was promulgated and enacted in
1951 which is indicative that the language adopted may have been derived
from better sources than some of the older statutes.
Although the Oil and Gas Commission Act does not specifically mention the words "declaratory judgment," any person adversely affected by
and dissatisfied with any rule issued by the Commission may bring a civil
action to test the validity of the rule within 90 days of promulgation
thereof and may secure an injunction and other appropriate relief in25
cluding all rights to appeal.
Unfortunately the vast majority of the agency statutes in Wyoming
provide no such procedure or safeguards to interested persons, and reform
in this area is badly needed. If and when reform is undertaken in this
area, the Oil and Gas Commission Act merits study along with the Model
State Act and other sources of information.
CHALLENGE ABSENT

STATUTORY

AUTHORITY

The preceding discussion is based upon the assumption that statutory
authorization to challenge is available. 25a However, absent statutory
provision for challenge an individual may effectively challenge administrative action by other means.
Even though express provisions for challenge are sporadic in the
agency statutes, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act has been in effect
in Wyoming since 1923.26 Under this Act:
Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations
are affected by a statute (or) municipal ordinance . . . may have

determined any question of construction or validity arising . . .
a declaration of rights, status or other legal
thereunder and obtain
27
relations thereunder.
In other jurisdictions28 the declaratory judgment has been used to
challenge agency rules as not lying within the authority of the statute
conferring the power upon the agency, or if within the authority conferred
by statute, to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, thus providing
an indirect method of challenging such rules. Since Wyoming has adopted
the Declaratory Judgment Act any person affected by agency rules may9
2
probably invoke this remedy where no other remedy has been provided.
Another effective method of challenging governmental action is the
taxpayer suit.3 0

The taxpayers suit is brought on behalf of the plaintiff

and for the benefit of all taxpayers of the particular class (e.g., state or
25. Wyo. Stat. § 30-225 (a) (1957).
25a. By statutory authorization it is meant authorization included in the appropriate
agency statute.
26. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1049 through § 1-1064, Title 1, ch. 38 (1957).
27. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1052 (1957).
28. Preisler v. Doherty, 364 Mo. 596, 265 S.W.2d 404 (1954); Magenheim v. Board of
Education, ____Mo. - 347 S.W.2d 409 (1961).
29. See R. Anderson, op. cit. supra note 1.
30. For an excellent discussion of taxpayers suits, see Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 895.

NoTEs

municipality). The sole function of the taxpayers suit appears to be to
challenge governmental action that would otherwise go unchallenged in
the courts because of the lack of standing and a public expenditure may or
may not be involved.
The right of a taxpayer to bring action on behalf of himself and for
the benefit of all taxpayers in the state of Wyoming, to enjoin the Secretary
from certifying a question adopted by the state legislature to the county
clerks at the next general election, was upheld in Spriggs v. Clark.31 The
plaintiff asserted the unconstitutionality of the resolution and the consequent illegal use and expenditure of public funds in election expense
if the question was so certified. The defendant argued that courts of
equity have no authority or jurisdiction to interpose for the protection of
rights which are merely political and involve no civil or property rights
and that for this reason the plaintiff did not possess sufficient interest in
the cause to warrant institution of the suit. Therefore, he said the plaintiff's interest, if any, was trifling and there was no special or irreparable
injury to his civil or property rights. The court stated:
However, there seem to be well considered cases which recognize
an exception to the general rule just mentioned, where an election
would be quite without authority of law and would be void,
thereby causing unnecessary and improper expense. In such
events it is declared that a taxpayer or oter person who will be
injured thereby is entitled to an injunction.
The court clearly upheld the right of the plaintiff taxpayer to bring the
32
action before considering the constitu-tional issue.
In Stratton v. City of Riverton,33 plaintiffs as taxpayers and residents
brought action against the city and its officers to enjoin construction of a
through street across the city park. The court held that where the land
had been dedicated as a public park without reservation for use of the
public, the city was properly enjoined from constructing a through road or
street for public use across the public park. On appeal the city asserted
that plaintiffs had not standing or right to maintain the action. The
court disposed of this conten-tion by stating:
Both plaintiffs are residents and taxpayers of Riverton. One has
his residence across the street from the park; the other resides
about four blocks away. As such residents and taxpayers they
were qualified to bring the action. It was not necessary to prove
special damage.
A taxpayer brought suit in Sump v. City of Sheridan34 to enjoin the
city from spending money for the purportedly unlawful purpose of control31.
32.
33.

45 Wyo. 62, 14 P.2d 667 (1932). See also Bourne v. Cole, 53 Wyo. 31, 77 P.2d 617
(1938), upholding taxpayer action to enjoin the Secretary of State from performance of a purportedly illegal contract authorized by the legislature.
Judgment was subsequently rendered for the defendant on the ground that the
resolution was constitutional.
74 Wyo. 379, 287 P.2d 627 (1955).

34..... Wyo. .- , 358 P.2d 637 (1951), rehearing denied, ___Wyo ..... 359 P.2d 1008 (1961).
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ling floods.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court

in granting a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The decision rested
solely upon the legality of the defendants spending and no question was
raised in the opinion as to the standing of the taxpayer to sue.
Very recently a group of twelve electors were permitted to challenge
administrative action on no more of a showing than they were being denied
access to the public domain, including a national forest as the result of the
County Commissioners failure to cause certain obstructions to be removed
4
from a country road.3 a
Thus the Supreme Court of Wyoming has upheld actions on both the
state and municipal level to enjoin both public expenditures and nonfiscal matters. On this basis it would appear that the Supreme Court
would follow decisions from such states as New York, Oregon and Washington in upholding the rights of an individual to challenge on behalf of
the general public on other matters, although there are no cases bearing
directly on this point.
The New York Court, in Kuhn v. Curran,35 overlooked the question of
standing because they felt that the issue was of unusual importance to the
public and then proceeded to consider the merits of the constitutional issue
presented. The court also upheld the standing of a "resident and citizen,"
in People ex rel. Pumpyansky v. Keating,36 to challeneg the validity of a
license even though he made no claim to a special interest. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming reached the same conclusion, that it was not necessary
3
to allege or prove special damages in Stratton v. City of Riverton. T
Plaintiff taxpayers brought action to enjoin the School District from
supplying textbooks without charge to parochial schools in Dickman v.
Although defendants challenged
School District No. 62C, Oregon City.38
the plaintiffs standing to raise any constitutional issue other than violation
of the due process clause, the Oregon Court held that the defendants failure
to raise the issue by pleading constituted a waiver.8 9
The view of permitting taxpayers to bring action against governmental
officials as applied by the more liberal courts, of which Wyoming appears to
be one, provides an efficient control over governmental action by the private
citizen which may be used to protect his interests as well as that of the
general public. The liberal attitude of the Wyoming Court is reflected
34a. Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County v. State, 369 P.2d 537 (Wyo.
1962).
35. 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945).
36. 168 N.Y. 390, 61 N.E. 637 (1901).
37. See note 33, supra. Contra, Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. 455, 131 N.E.2d 372 (1956).
38. ____
Ore-.... 366 P.2d 533 (1961).
39. Washington also permits taxpayers to challenge administrative action but a demand
by a taxpayer upon the proper public official to take appropriate action is a condition precedent to the maintenance of such action. State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie,
45 Wash. Repts.2d, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).
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by a very recent decision in which the court granted mandamus at the
request of twelve electors who brought action on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated to require the Board of County Commissioners to
remove obstructions from a public road. 40 Insofar as appears, the plaintiffs were not necessarily taxpayers, their individual legal rights were not
affected and they had no pecuniary interest in keeping the particular road
(which provided access to the public domain including a national forest)
open.
JERRY A. YAAP
40.

Board of County Commissioners of County of Fremont v. State, ___ Wyo
P.2d 537 (1962).
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